تاثیر ویژگی‌های هیأت مدیره و جبهه‌گیری مدیریت بر استراتژی متنوع‌سازی شرکت

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری حسابداری، واحد تبریز، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تبریز، ایران

2 استادیار گروه حسابداری، واحد تبریز، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تبریز، ایران

چکیده

هدف این پژوهش بررسی نقش ویژگی‌های هیأت مدیره و جبهه‌گیری مدیریت بر استراتژی متنوع‌سازی شرکت‌های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران می‌باشد. در این راستا تعداد 110 شرکت برای دوره زمانی 1387-1393 انتخاب گردید. از روش داده‌های ترکیبی برای آزمون فرضیه‌های پژوهش استفاده شد. برای بررسی ویژگی‌های هیأت مدیره از شاخص‌های اندازه و استقلال هیأت مدیره و برای بررسی جبهه‌گیری مدیریت از سه شاخص دوگانگی پست مدیر عامل، مالکیت مدیریتی و ریسک سرمایه‌گذاری بیشتر از حد استفاده شده است. همچنین جهت اندازه‌گیری متنوع‌سازی شرکتی از دو شاخص هرفیندال و آنتروپی استفاده شد. نتایج نشان می‌دهد که اندازه و استقلال هیأت مدیره به ترتیب یک تاثیر مثبت و منفی بر متنوع‌سازی شرکت دارند. بدین معنی که در شرکت‌هایی با هیأت مدیره‌های بزرگ و استقلال پایین اعضای هیأت مدیره، متنوع‌سازی شرکت در سطح بالایی است. همچنین نتایج نشان داد که دوگانگی پست مدیر عامل و افزایش ریسک سرمایه‌گذاری بیشتر از حد بر متنوع‌سازی شرکت تاثیر مثبتی دارند در حالی که مالکیت مدیریتی تاثیری بر متنوع‌سازی شرکت ندارد. نتایج سازگار با تئوری نمایندگی می‌باشد. مطابق این تئوری افزایش تضاد بین سهامداران و مدیران موجب می‌شود تا مدیران داخلی شرکت برای انجام رفتارهای فرصت‌طلبانه خود در جهت متنوع‌سازی شرکت، انگیزه داشته باشند.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Effect of the Board Characteristics and Management Entrenchment on Firm Diversification Strategy

نویسندگان [English]

  • Vahid Taghizadeh Khanqah 1
  • Mehdi Zeinali 2
1 islamic azad university of tabriz
2 islamic azad university of tabriz
چکیده [English]

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the board characteristics and the management entrenchment on the diversification strategy at firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. In this regard, 110 companies were selected for the period 2008-2014. Panel data method was used to test the hypotheses. In order to examine board characteristics, board size and board independence proxies and to review the management entrenchment, CEO duality, managerial ownership and over investment risk were used. For measuring corporate diversification, Herfindahl and entropy were used. The results show that the size and independence board have negative and positive effects on corporate diversification. This means that company diversification is at high level with large boards and low independent board members. The results show that the CEO duality and the increase of over investment risk have a positive effect on corporate diversification, while managerial ownership has no effect on diversification. The results are consistent with agency theory. According to this theory, the increase in the conflict between shareholders and managers makes the internal managers motivated for opportunistic behavior in order to diversify their enterprise.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Board Characteristic
  • Management Entrenchment
  • Diversification
  • agency theory
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