The Relationship Between Ownership Structure and Performance: Evidence from the Iranian Stock Market

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 MSc in Economics - Sharif University of Technology

2 Assistant professor/Khatam University

3 Assistant Professor of Finance, Graduate School of Management and Economics, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran

10.22051/jfm.2023.40885.2705

Abstract

Pyramidal and network ownership structures, which give ultimate owners greater control rights over companies than cash flow rights, are prevalent in the Iranian stock market. Given the complex shareholding networks and significant changes in the ownership structures of large Iranian firms over the past two decades, this study aims to examine the relationship between ownership structure and company performance. Four measures are used to analyze ownership structure: cash flow right of the largest shareholder, wedge between control right and cash flow right of the largest shareholder, difference in cash flow rights of the two largest shareholders, and type of ownership. The study investigates their relationship with the performance and stock returns of 261 listed companies during the period of 2015 to 2020. The results indicate a positive and significant association between the cash flow right of the largest shareholder and firm performance, but only when the largest shareholder owns at least 15% of the company's shares. For firms with only one owner and less than 50% in control rights, there is no significant correlation between the cash flow right of the largest shareholder and performance. The study also reveals that ownership by insurance companies has a positive correlation with firm performance, while quasi-governmental ownerships have a negative correlation with performance.

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References

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History

  • Receive Date: 29 June 2022
  • Revise Date: 04 May 2023
  • Accept Date: 09 October 2023

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